Abstract: Terms like to joke (and joking) and to tease (and teasing) have a curious double life in contrastive and interactional pragmatics and related fields. Occasionally they are studied as metapragmatic terms of ordinary English, along with related expressions such as kidding. More commonly they are used as scientific or technical categories, both for research into English and for cross-linguistic and cross-cultural comparison. Related English adjectives, such as jocular and mock, are also much-used in a growing lexicon of compound terms, such as jocular abuse, mock abuse, jocular mockery, and the like.
2 A metalanguage critiques of conventional approaches to conversational humor 2.1 A confusion of terms, a confusion of concepts A review of recent scholarly writing on conversational humor shows that it routinely employs a profusion of ordinary English words in its informal descriptive vocabulary. These include (i) speech-act verbs such as joke and tease, and derivatives such as jocular, (ii) nouns designating speech-acts or mini-genres, such as quip, pun, joke, anecdote, banter, wisecrack, wordplay, repartee, (iii) adjectives describing or attributing intent or effect, such as funny, amusing, not serious, witty, ironic and sarcastic, and related nouns, such as irony, sarcasm, and amusement. Often such terms are used without any attempt at definition, but when definitions are offered they leave much to be desired. A sample of such definitions is given in Table 1 .
The definitions in Table 1 exhibit the usual faults of non-systematic lexicography, especially reliance on complex, language-specific terms, with consequent vagueness and, in many cases, circularity. For instance, Holmes and Marra's (2002) definition of quip relies on equally problematical words such as witty and ironic, not to mention technical locutions such as 'ongoing transactional topic." Norrick's (1993) definition of banter depends on the English-specific words humorous and (mutual) entertainment. Without laboring the point, in these definitions we see a maze of interrelated and overlapping English terms and no attempt whatever to be systematic. teasing: "a personally addressed remark with a bite, often performed in front of a public" (Kotthoff : ) quip: "a short, witty but also ironic comment about the on-going transaction or topic under discussion", "a witty aside" (Holmes and Marra : )
banter: "rapid exchange of humorous lines oriented toward a common theme, though aimed primarily at mutual entertainment, rather than topic talk …" (Norrick : ) humor: "can be defined in terms of the speaker's intent to elicit a feeling of what is variously referred to in the literature as amusement Ruch () , mirth (Martin ) , or nonseriousness (Chafe ), or by …." (Bell ) amusement: "the state of experiencing funny and often entertaining events or situations … most frequently associated with laughter …" (Ruch : )
"Joking, kidding, teasing": Slippery categories So far we have been talking about the use of English terms as informal descriptors. Some English terms achieve a more prominent status when they are elevated to technical or semi-technical terms. In pragmatics, the most discussed example is of course politeness, and it is now established practice to distinguish between politeness 1 and politeness 2 , referring to the everyday and technical meanings, respectively. In the subfield of conversational humor, perhaps the most notable applications of politeness are the following equations (from Culpeper (1996: 356) and Bousfield (2008) ; respectively, both following Leech (1983) , cf. Leech (2014) ): sarcasm = mock politeness banter = mock impoliteness Clearly, a definition such as sarcasm = mock politeness would have no plausibility if the word politeness is used in its ordinary language sense, as witness everyday sarcastic expressions such as My heart bleeds for you. Taylor (2015: 127) comments:
the equation of mock politeness with sarcasm/irony is problematic because the label of sarcasm is simultaneously too broad, because behaviors labeled as sarcastic do not always perform mock politeness, and too narrow because there are mock polite behaviors which would not be labelled as sarcastic in either the lay or academic/theoretical senses; cf. Goddard and Levisen (Forthcoming).
The above "equations" also illustrate another common terminological practice, namely, the coining of new compound terms with the aid of modifiers such as mock. In addition to mock politeness and mock impoliteness, current literature employs the expressions mock abuse and mock sarcasm, and a number of other mock-terms. But what is meant by mock in these uses? Haugh and Bousfield (2012) adduce definitions from the Miriam-Webster Dictionary: "having the character of imitation" or being "simulated" or "feigned … to look like the real thing" or "not based on real feelings". Aside from their problematical complexity, these definitions surely leave out a crucial element, namely, that "mock" performances are intended to be recognizable as mock by the audience, in order to achieve a special effect.
Even more prolific than mock is the modifier jocular (roughly, "like people do when they are joking"); for example, in expressions like jocular irony, jocular abuse, jocular mockery, jocular insult, jocular deception/provocation, jocular teasing. By the way, to fend off accusations of any "holier than thou" attitude, I am happy to confess that I have published a study about "deadpan jocular irony" in Australian English . So briefly, the terminological cycle goes something like this. (i) One starts with ordinary English words, poorly defined or undefined, then (ii) "technicalizes" them and extends their range, often making some formal adjustments along the way, e.g. using adjective + nominalization combinations or coining backformations such as a tease, or a bant. (iii) Subsequently there is uptake, i.e. different scholars begin to employ the terms, often using them in slightly different ways from the original authors.
1 (iv) Scholarly debate begins about what the new terms mean or should mean, how the terms relate to one another, etc. It may be swimming against the tide to say so but in my view the confusion of terminology betokens a confusion of concepts.
Anglo English speech acts are not cross-translatable even into French and German
Surprising as it may be to many Anglophone scholars, semantically complex terms like joke and tease, wit and humor, are English-specific in their meanings to a greater or lesser degree. Not one of them has precise equivalents even across a sample of major Indo-European languages, such as French, German, and Russian, let alone across the diverse languages of the world. Conversely, of course, these and other languages have words which cannot be well rendered into English (cf. Cassin ed. 2014). For instance, French has no verb which closely matches English to joke (in the sense of conversational joking, as opposed to "telling a joke"). Goddard and Mullan (In press ) provide a detailed examination of some of the nearest dictionary equivalents -plaisanter "joke, kid, speak light-heartedly" and rigoler "laugh, kid around, have fun together" -finding that both are significantly different in their meanings to the English verb joke. Likewise, French has no single word in this arena that is a perfect match for English teasing. Roughly speaking, "sharp" teasing can be described as taquiner, but most light, conversational teasing would be covered by the more general verb plaisanter.
German, too, has no verb comparable to English joke. One uses expressions based on the nouns Witz, which is a bit like joke (also wit), or Spaß, usually translated as "fun". Unbewussten (1905) , but the translation of Witz has caused no end of problems, both in French and English. English translators have generally settled on "jokes" (cf. Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious), but Freud's translator Strachey recognizes that "Joke … is too wide and seems to cover the German Scherz as well" (Pons 2014: 487, 489 ).
2.3 The dangers of using "technicalized" English as a descriptive language
Humor studies is today dominated by Anglophone discourse, and, arguably, by Anglocentric categories. Despite the numerous published studies of humor practices in non-English linguacultures, the taxonomies and overviews of humor forms provided in Norrick (1993) , Dynel (2009), and Langlotz (2015) , for example, hardly mention any languages other than English. In principle, these oversights could be remedied by simply adding more references to languages other than English, but I would contend that the problem runs deeper. This point cannot be fully argued here, but NSM researchers have persistently argued that taking English-specific words as a starting point for theory construction -in any domain -inevitably leads to a skewed Anglocentric view of the phenomena (Wierzbicka 2009 (Wierzbicka , 2014a . A second danger of using English, including technical English, as a descriptive metalanguage is that in so doing one inevitably loses touch with the insider perspective, as it is termed in linguistic anthropology. That is, one loses touch with how things appear to the actual participants. The process was revealingly described by Weider and Pratt (1990) , using the expression "the inverted gloss". Weider and Pratt quote Garfinkel and Sacks (1986: 186) , who observed how the analyst creates a glossary of approximate translations of the natives' terms and then "recommends to colleagues that he will mean by his translations of natives' terms what the natives were really talking about". Weider and Pratt (1990) comment: By inverting this gloss, the analyst (generally tacitly) asserts that what the native means by some remark is what the analyst means in his or her analysis …. the logical properties that would obtain for the theorist's questions and answers are attributed to the members' talk. (Weider and Pratt 1990: 66) Clearly, if we as Anglophone analysts apply English-specific categories and descriptors to discourse practices of French, German, Chinese or Persian, in place of the local categories and descriptors, then we are guilty of this failing. And, paraphrasing Weider and Pratt (1990) , we end up attributing or projecting our issues, as theorists, onto the "members' talk", i.e. onto the non-Anglo participants.
I contend that the critique of the "inverted gloss" is applicable even within a single language, as, for example, when English words like banter and sarcasm are glossed as "mock impoliteness" and "mock politeness", respectively (cf. Taylor 2015) . In short, using "technicalized English" allows -even encourages -slippage between insider/participant interpretation and outsider/scientist interpretation. Despite the distinction between "first-order" and "second-order" uses of terms, scholars keep getting mixed up between technical and ordinary language meanings of terms.
Finally, it should be obvious that untranslatable English-specific terms are not suitable as a theoretical vocabulary for intercultural or cross-cultural pragmatics.
3 Joking, kidding, teasing: Some key words for understanding Anglo conversational humor
This section proposes NSM semantic explications, i.e. explanatory paraphrases consisting of simple cross-translatable words, for English verbs joke, kid and tease, in the relevant senses. The purpose is two-fold: first, to separate and make explicit the various meaning components that are bundled together in these words, and second, to see what these meanings may be able tell us about the ethnopragmatics of Anglo English.
Method
Briefly, the NSM approach is a systematic approach to lexical semantics, based on a highly constrained metalanguage of 65 primitive word-meanings which appear to be expressible lexically in all or most languages. Examples include:
equivalents in all or most languages, framing explications in terms of semantic primes wards off the danger of terminological Anglocentrism. NSM research recognizes that certain non-primitive meanings can function alongside semantic primes as building blocks of meaning. In NSM parlance, these are termed "semantic molecules". The selection of semantic molecules is non-arbitrary and it must be demonstrable that they can themselves be explicated down to the level of semantic primes without circularity.
2 These aspects of the NSM theory cannot be dealt with here (cf. Goddard 2016), but for present purposes, it is important to note that the verb laugh is a proposed semantic molecule (see Appendix 2). This means that it can be used in semantic explications for words like joke, kid, tease and other "humor-related" concepts. It will be helpful to highlight two different ways in which the semantic molecule laugh can enter into humor-related explications, depending on whether the speaker's (ostensible) intention is for the addressee or audience (a) to feel something good and laugh, or (b) to feel something good "like people often feel when they laugh." These components are appropriate for different purposes. For example, Goddard (2017) argues that the former is appropriate for the meaning of the English word funny, while the latter is appropriate for the meaning of the English word amusing.
In this section I will propose NSM explications for English verbs joke, kid and tease. It is not possible here to fully explain the process by which explications are devised and refined. The following brief observations will have to suffice. The development process involves taking various kinds of linguistic evidence into account (such as collocations, grammatical characteristics, contrasts with related words, and substitutability into contexts of use), deciding on issues of lexical polysemy, and ensuring that successive versions of the explication conform with NSM grammar. Taking account of these different aspects means that explications are time-consuming to construct. Typically, a published explication will have passed through 6-10 versions before reaching a form deemed suitable for publication. Essentially the NSM analyst faces the same challenge as a lexicographer, i.e. formulating a paraphrase that matches the range of use of a word, but under the added constraint of doing so using a small controlled vocabulary of cross-translatable words.
The present analysis was corpus-assisted. Collocational and frequency data, and many naturally occurring examples, were obtained from WordBanks Online, a commercially available corpus of English. They were augmented by examples taken from the internet and from personal observations.
Explicating joking and kidding
To begin, here is an overview of the grammatical properties of the two words addressed in this subsection. (i) They are both verbs. (ii) Joke is intransitive, while kid may take an addressee object. (iii) Joke can take a prepositional phrase for topic, e.g. joking about the boss and/or co-participant, e.g. joking with his customers. This is only marginally possible with kid, though there is some dialect variation on this point. (iv) Joke has nominal counterpart(s), i.e. joke and jokes. Both forms, especially the plural form, jokes, can refer to generalized "things said while joking," i.e. it doesn't necessarily refer to so-called "canned jokes", as in the fixed expression tell a joke. (v) Joke can take agentive -er, i.e. joker, while kid cannot, cf. *kidder. (vi) Joke has adjectival and adverbial forms, i.e. jocular and jokingly. As for kid, corresponding forms are marginal, though in the 2016 American election, Donald Trump famously remarked "Well, I said it kiddingly".
Joking
Here are some representative examples of the verb joke, in the sense under consideration here.
(1) It was a little awkward at first but they were soon laughing and joking.
[WordBanks]
(2) He likes to joke with his staff (friends, family, etc.).
(3) Let's stop joking about depression. Let's stop joking about any and all mental illnesses. And let's stop joking about suicide. [thetempest.co/2017/04/28/entertainment/pepsi-messed-up-big-time-and-so-did-all-of-these-other-brands/]
As observed by Wierzbicka (1987) , joking cannot be explicated simply saying something "in order to excite laughter", in the style of many dictionaries, because we need to distinguish joke from ridicule and from mock, for example. Clearly the intention to induce laughing is part of the meaning, but more detail is required to make it clear that the apparent intention is simply to induce good feeling in the addressee or audience, rather than to serve some more complex motivation (as with ridicule or mock).
Consider explication [A] below. It is based on the idea that joking is, roughly speaking, a way of saying things which is prototypically expected and intended to cause people here to want to laugh and to feel good for a short time, i.e. it anticipates an "audience reaction".
[A] He was joking.
he said some things at that time he said it like people often say something when they think like this:
"when people here hear this, they can want to laugh [m] because of it, they can feel something good for a short time because of it I want this" it can be good if people do this at some times when they are with other people A number of subtle aspects of explication [A] warrant comment. First, the intention components (the indented lines) are not being attributed directly to the person described as joking. Rather, that person's manner of speaking is being described with reference to a prototypical scenario of someone who speaks with that intention (like people often say something when they think like this: …). Second, the presence in the prototypical scenario of the expression 'people here' implies that the prototypical situation is being construed as a "social" one; the expression people here can of course include the speaker, as well as any others present. Third, the final component adds a measure of cultural endorsement. Finally, it may be worth noting that to describe people as joking doesn't necessarily imply any great sophistication or verbal artistry.
The claim that the meaning of joking involves laughing (strictly speaking, wanting to laugh) as an anticipated outcome is supported by collocational data from WordBanks, in which the expression laughing and joking (as in example (1) above) is common, with 200 tokens. On the other hand, in the same corpus, the expression laughing and kidding does not occur at all. Likewise, smiling and joking also occurs, albeit much less commonly, while smiling and kidding does not.
It is also notable that according to the WordBanks Word-Diff tool, joke occurs fairly frequently conjoined (with and or or) with the verbs talk and chat, implying ongoing verbal interaction. This is not the case with kid.
Due to space restrictions, we cannot pursue other aspects of joke here; for example, its use as a verb of report (e.g. "XXX", he/she joked), or how it relates semantically to derivative forms, such as the noun joke in its several uses. We turn now to kidding.
Kidding
Here are some representative examples of the verb kid. Clearly there is a close relationship between kidding and joking, evidenced by the fact that joke could be substituted for kid in (4) and (6), and by the coordinated joking and kidding in (5). It is quite typical that two out of three of these examples use the phrase just kidding. This will be addressed further below.
(4) "I think it just comes down to being female … no, no, just kidding", she said.
(5) She was fun loving and enjoyed joking and kidding around.
(6) You should have seen the look on Bill's face when Allen told him he was just kidding! Boy, was he relieved! [WordBanks]
A first glance at explication [B] for kidding will show that it is lengthier and more complex than explication [A] for joking and that it is directed towards a specific addressee ('he said something to someone'). This is of course consistent with the fact that, unlike joke, kid can take a direct object, e.g. I was just kidding you, You're kidding me, vs. *I was just joking you, *You're joking me.
[B] He was kidding.
he said something to someone when he said it, he thought like this:
"when this someone hears this, he/she can think like this: 'this can't be true' at this moment, he/she won't know why I said it a moment after, he/she can know why I said it he/she can then feel something good for a short time, like people often feel when they laugh [m] I want this"
Looking at explication [B] more closely, one can see that, unlike joke, it attributes a specific, fairly complex, intention to the subject, and moreover, that it involves, to use an informal expression, "messing with the addressee's head". According to the explication, when kidding, the subject's apparent intention is for the addressee to be momentarily disbelieving and confused, before realizing what is going on and feeling "amused", i.e. briefly "feeling something good like people often feel when they laugh" (Goddard 2017 ).
The intention to induce a moment of confusion or disbelief helps explain why in interactional data, there is often slightly delayed laughter, following instances of declared kidding (Haugh 2016) . The component "a moment after, he/she can know why I said it" implies that it may require a little thinking for the addressee to see the speaker's intention.
Note that the penultimate components attributed to the subject ("he/she can then feel something good for a short time, like people often feel when they laugh [m], I want this") are very similar to the corresponding components in the explication for joke. This accounts for the fact that kidding can be seen as a kind of joking. Indeed, it would be fair to say that kidding is a "micro-genre" of joking.
I close this subsection with an observation about a non-obvious grammatical/collocational difference between joke and kid, turned up by WordBanks Word-Diff tool. It is that the verb joke is compatible with manner adverbs which attribute a psychological state to the subject, whereas the verb kid is not. Compare: joke nervously, joke bitterly, joke wryly; *kid nervously, *kid bitterly, *kid wryly. It seems likely that this difference is correlated with the different explication structure. With joke, as explicated in [A] , one says that the subject spoke as people often do when they anticipate the people present laughing because they say something and want this outcome. No actual intention is attributed to the subject. This is compatible with adding an attribution of the subject's individual mental state. With kid, on the other hand, as explicated in [B] , one attributes a particular, fairly complex, mental state to the speaker and this, it seems, blocks any further, competing, attribution.
Only joking!, just kidding!
Only joking!, just kidding!, and variants, are important English speech formulas (cf. Skalicky et al. 2015; Haugh 2016) . Just kidding! appears to be by far the most common.
They are explicated in [C1] and [C2] below. Notice that the first line of both explications includes 'I' and 'you', i.e. the message is interactional, and that it is hinged around the semantic prime BECAUSE, i.e. the speaker is explaining why he/she spoke as he/she did. The explanatory aspect is reinforced by the final component 'I didn't say it because of anything else', which corresponds to the words just and only in the phrases just/only kidding and just/only joking. "when this someone hears this, he/she can think like this: 'this can't be true' at this moment, he/she won't know why I said it a moment after, he/she can know why I said it he/she can then feel something good for a short time, like people often feel when they laugh [m] I want this" I didn't say it because of anything else Needless to say, these and other explications do not necessarily represent the true situation. They are simply modelling the speaker's expressed meaning. It is entirely possible for someone who has deliberately said something nasty or ill-intentioned to "take cover", as it were, by claiming that they were only joking, just kidding, etc.
Explicating teasing
Teasing is a very important word in English, and it is one of those words which is heavily technicalized in scholarly use. There is a large literature on teasing practices in anthropology and social psychology, as well as in pragmatics; for an overview, see Haugh (2017) . From a lexicographic point of view, the puzzle posed by the word tease is that it designates a verbal practice which can be enacted with apparently contradictory motives or attitudes: as the Australian Oxford Dictionary puts it "playfully or unkindly or annoyingly". Consistent with this, the word teasing is compatible with wide range of different, and apparently inconsistent, adjectives, e.g. playful teasing, hostile teasing, friendly teasing, vicious teasing.
3 Many writers simply make a distinction between "pro-social"
and "anti-social" teasing, e.g. Keltner et al. (2001) , but this sidesteps the lexicalsemantic issue: is the verb tease polysemous, with two distinct-but-related meanings, or does it have a single meaning which is compatible with different motives and attitudes?
Here are a few representative examples. From a grammatical point of view, it is notable that the "target" appears as a direct object and that the "topic" of the teasing can be indicated in a prepositional phrase with about. The semantic explication presented in [D] follows Olivieri (2003) in upholding the single meaning interpretation for tease. Shortly, we will work through this explication [D] in stages, but for the moment note that the wording of the first two components ('he said some things about this someone, he wanted this someone to hear it') reflects the fact that teasing often employs so-called "tangential address" (Günthner 1996; cited Kotthoff 2007) , i.e. the teasing utterance may be ostensibly addressed to other people present. A typical example would be: Oh look! Here comes Katie's boyfriend! (said to Katie's friends, but in Katie's presence).
[D] He was teasing her (about something).
he said some things about this someone (her) he wanted this someone to hear it when he said it, he thought like this:
"I know that this someone doesn't want people to say such things I know that when I say these things, this someone will feel something bad because of it, not something very bad at the same time, I know that someone else here can feel something good because of it like people often feel when they want to laugh [m] I want to say it because of this"
After the initial two lines, the explication continues with a set of assumptions and intentions that are attributed to the subject ('when he said this, he thought like this: …'). The first two assumptions (introduced by 'I know …') concern what is termed in the literature the "provocative" content of a teasing utterance. It is important to allow that the teasing person does not necessarily have to be saying something bad about the target: it can be anything that the target is "sensitive" about. It is quite possible to tease someone about something good, provided it is assumed that the target doesn't want people talking about such things. For example, in Australia one can tease someone about an award or distinction they have received. Nevertheless, the majority of topics that are teased about are no doubt characteristics which are not generally admired, such as certain physical attributes (e.g. having big ears), mild disabilities (e.g. stuttering), or belonging to a minority race, religion or ethnicity.
The teaser's starting assumptions are, first: "I know that this someone doesn't want people to say such things", and second: "I know that when I say these things, this someone will feel something bad because of it", with the proviso that it is "not something very bad." Even with the (attributed) mental proviso that the target's bad feeling won't be very bad, the content of the explication to this point poses the question: why is the subject willing to disregard the target's anticipated negative reaction? Is it because he or she wants to hurt the target, as would be the case with verbs such as insult or abuse?
4 Not according to the following components, which set out the subject's ostensible motive as follows:
"at the same time, I know that someone else here can feel something good because of it like people often feel when they want to laugh [m] I want to say it because of this"
This set of components is, in many ways, the key to understanding the semantic "essence" of teasing -and they also, of course, make explicit the semantic link between joking and kidding, on the one hand, and teasing, on the other; namely, that all of them are intended or anticipated to bring about some good feeling, and that they are all connected, albeit in slightly different ways, with laughing. Overviewing explication [D] in full, one may say that it represents a finely balanced set of components that contrast and offset each other to achieve a kind of marriage of opposites: a speech practice which goes against the wishes of one person (the target) and imposes a measure of bad feeling upon this person in the interests of bringing about amusement and laughter for others.
From the point of view of pragmatic function, someone who defends themselves against an accusation of nastiness or bullying by saying I was just teasing is, in a sense, "taking cover" under the word teasing, claiming that their intention was relatively mild, even innocuous. From a psychological point of view, one may argue that the existence of the teasing concept may encourage mean or nasty speech behaviors, inasmuch as a mean-spirited or unsympathetic person can easily tell him or herself that the target will not suffer very much and proceed without scruples. These aspects (discursive and psychological affordances) are beyond the scope of lexical semantics proper and cannot be pursued here.
What should be apparent, however, is that the particular configuration of components in explication [D] is compatible with a wide range of attitudes and manners of implementation. It seems highly unlikely that such a finely balanced set of components would have exact lexical equivalents in most languages.
Implications for Anglo ethnopragmatics
The results reported so far contribute to an on-going project of de-naturalizing Anglo English speech practices, not only in relation to "humor" (Goddard , 2009 (Goddard , 2017 Goddard and Cramer 2017; Goddard and Mullan In press), but in relation to forms of address, directives, emotional expression, epistemic attitudes, arguing and advice-giving, interactional routines, and many other areas (cf. e.g. Béal 1992; Goddard 2012; Farese 2017; Peeters 2000; Wierzbicka 2003 Wierzbicka , 2006a Wierzbicka , 2006b Wierzbicka , 2016 Levisen 2012 ; for a brief overview, see Goddard and Ye (2015) .
Specifically in relation to Anglo "conversational humor", the key thing to bear in mind is that Anglo speakers approach "conversation" with a lexicon of guiding ideas in their heads. The lexical semantics of joking (in the sense explicated here) designates a culturally approved speech activity which is socially oriented, i.e. ostensibly intended to amuse/entertain (not, for example, to display one's cleverness or wit). The lexical semantics of kidding establishes a micro-genre of joking based, roughly speaking, on momentary deception. The lexical semantics of teasing designates a social activity, linked with laughter, that targets a particular person present and is capable of being construed in a positive light on account of the ostensible intention to be "amusing". In Bahktin's memorable phrase, these lexical categories establish "ready-made forms of the utterance".
Needless to say, it would be wrong to assume that any language is monolithic and devoid of cultural and sociolinguistic variation. If we look to more local lexical categories, including fixed phrasal expressions, in the same broad domain as joking, kidding and teasing, we will find ourselves rewarded with a rich harvest of dialectal expressions, including the following from Australian English and American English alone (some of these belong only to sub-varieties of these two broad "national" categories).
Australian English: take the piss, gee up, stir up, chiack, pull someone's leg, have a lend of someone, send up, … American English: razz, josh, wisecrack, roast, pick at, rile Of these, take the piss has so far attracted the greatest scholarly attention (Davis 2009; Goddard 2009; Haugh 2014) , with a smaller number of studies touching on gee up and stir up (Rowen 2012; Goddard 2017) , chiack (Wierzbicka 1997: 202-206) , leg-pulling and other jocular deception (Goddard , 2017 . Evidently a great deal remains to be done.
Contrastive ethnopragmatics of "laughing
with other people"
Re-framing the field of inquiry
Though ethnopragmatics can be fruitfully practiced within a single linguaculture, it does so using culture-independent tools. This makes contrastive ethnopragmatics a methodologically sound framework for cross-cultural and intercultural comparison in diverse areas of study. Is it possible, then, to envisage a contrastive ethnopragmatics of conversational humor, leading in due course to a broad typology of conversational humor (as envisaged by Béal and Mullan (2013) , for example)? No, actually. From an ethnopragmatic point of view, it would not be right to base a field of inquiry on such highly English-specific terms as "humor" and "conversation".
From an Anglo point of view, it may be hard to see the problem, especially in view of the frequent claims in Anglophone anthropology, psychology and linguistics (e.g. Apte 1985; Attardo 2004; Martin 2007 ) that "humor" is a human universal, just as "politeness", "rights", "altruism", and any number of similarly English-specific terms, have been claimed to designate human universals (Wierzbicka 2014a) .
According to the analysis in Goddard (2017) , the lexical semantics of the everyday English word humor implies (i) speakers often setting about to induce a feeling of "amusement" in those present, i.e. speaking with the intention of inducing a good feeling 'like people often feel when they want to laugh', and (ii) this being generally seen as a good thing. Many -probably most -languages and cultures do not have any exactly matching word or concept (see Appendix 3).
5
To be fair, scholars in humor studies often appear to be working with a broader concept in mind. Attardo (2004) , for example, says explicitly that "humor" is a technical term with a broader meaning than in everyday English, and although he declines to define it, it seems to me that it may be roughly glossable as: "joking or something like joking". In view of the discussion and analysis undertaken in Sections 2-3, we know that joking is not a cross-linguistically stable anchor point, but equally we know that laughter (strictly speaking, laugh) is.
All this leads to the following conclusion: we need to re-frame the research field, basing it, roughly speaking, on "social laughter" or "laughing with other people". It is generally agreed that laughter is a universal human behavior with a biological basis, that it is prototypically associated with good feeling, and that it is pre-eminently social, even to the point that people are much more inclined to laugh when they are with other people than when they are alone (unlike crying). There is a vast literature on laughter, reaching back to classical times and embracing philosophical, psychological, and sociological aspects. Useful overviews can be found in Plessner (1970) , Provine (2000) and Chafe (2007) . In recent times, a vigorous literature on laughter has grown up in biology. It seems likely that social laughter releases brain chemicals known as endorphins, a mechanism which underlies the pleasant and stress-releasing phenomenology of laughter (Manninen et al. 2017; cf. Dunbar 2012) . As for the semantics of the word laugh, an explication is given in Appendix 2. See Goddard (2017) and Wierzbicka (2014b) for discussion.
Above, I described the re-framed research field as "social laughter" or "laughing with other people". To be a little more precise, one could describe it as the research field that studies culturally shaped situations in which people laugh or can laugh with good feeling in response to something someone says or does. This characterization casts a wider net than humor studies as presently practiced, while being more restricted than simply the study of laughter per se. 6 If it were necessary or convenient to further restrict ourselves to "conversational" settings, this could be done by reference to a situation script like the following:
someone is with someone else in a place for some time there can be some other people with them during this time, these people are saying some things as people often do in many places at many times when they are with other people This little bundle of components enables us to focus on ordinary everyday interactions, excluding public forms and performances, written genres, and the like.
Importance of culture-specific communicative values
At the same time as advocating that when we embark on the contrastive ethnopragmatics of "laughing with other people" we should leave the concept of "humor" behind, it seems important to (re)emphasise that one should always approach ethnopragmatics with an eye to any local cultural values that carry implications for communication style (Carbaugh 2017) .
The point is that people may engage in verbal practices that trigger laughter not in the interests of "humor", but as a by-product of pleasant interaction or in pursuit of some other interactional or social ideals. To make this more concrete, consider two brief examples. It seems that some cultures have ideals of speaking with cleverness or wit: roughly, saying something which shows that one can think very well and very quickly, and/or saying something very well phrased and perfectly suited to the moment. For example, in French the cultural key word esprit designates a special "liveliness of mind" which would manifest itself in such a way of speaking (Pons 2014) . In Persian (Farsi), it is a cultural ideal to speak bā maze [lit. with taste], which designates an artful and appealing verbal skill (Arab Forthcoming) . Now, when someone speaks with esprit or bā maze, this is likely in many instances to elicit a certain measure of laughter as a reaction of "delight", so to speak, i.e. to a sudden good feeling. That is not, however, the point of speaking with esprit or with maze.
Conversely, there can be cultural values that inhibit or circumscribe social laughter, making it unsuitable or unseemly outside a narrow range of contexts. In German business and working contexts, for example, jokes and social laughter conflict with the value of being ernsthaft "serious, intent on giving careful thought" (Cramer 2015: 64-69) , one contributory factor to a common Anglo perception of Germans as "serious-minded" (cf. Lewis 2006: 224; Davies 2004: 221-224) .
In all three cases, it would be misguided to interpret what is going on through the lens of the Anglo cultural ideal of "humor". To do so would lead at worst to distortion and at best to distraction. To develop a full, culturally anchored understanding of social laughter in different cultural settings, one needs to work through the local cultural values and concepts.
Final comment
One practical difficulty with the ethnopragmatic approach is the level of difficulty and effort required to produce plausible semantic explications. It would hardly be realistic to expect researchers in pragmatics or humor studies to become trained and skilled semantic analysts before they can proceed with their work. This is not to say that a moderate level of semantic know-how is an unrealistic expectation, especially for next generation researchers. In this respect, I am encouraged by the spread of basic knowledge about statistics and corpus techniques as tools of the trade in pragmatics and linguistics generally over the past 30 years. It is reasonable to look forward to the gradual diffusion of basic principles and skills of semantic analysis, especially to the principle of reductive paraphrase and to the realization of the advantages of formulating research questions and findings, as far as possible, in simple, cross-translatable words.
Even so, detailed lexical-semantic analysis is going to remain the province of specialist semanticists for the foreseeable future. In this situation I can offer only two suggestions. First, we need to encourage greater collaboration between researchers in cross-cultural pragmatics and cross-linguistic semantics. This means not only team building and collaborative projects, it also means reading into each other's literatures, encouraging one's graduate students to learn into the other field, organizing joint workshops and seminars, and the like. To adapt an old saying about real estate: collaboration, collaboration, collaboration. The second is to recognize that full semantic accuracy and full semantic explications are not always needed in order to make progress. Approximations and partial explications (sometimes just a single component, see Appendix 4) can often be very useful, as can be the use of Minimal English (Goddard 2018) rather than the stricter Natural Semantic Metalanguage. The main guideline is to try to minimize reliance on complex, technical and English-specific language.
Appendix 4: Some components to help reduce problematical terminology and ease cross-linguistic comparison This is a selection of key components, written in Minimal English (Goddard ed. 2018) , related to some commonly used terminology in humor studies. Most of them have been extracted from published NSM studies.
-abuse, mockery: saying something bad, or very bad, about someone else -trickery, deception:
saying something about something when one knows that it is not true -cleverness, wittiness:
when people hear it, they can think: this someone can think very well, this someone can think very quickly when people hear it, they can think: this someone can speak very well, people can't speak like this if they can't think very quickly -sarcasm:
saying something like (as if) one thinks something good about something when one doesn't think like this, one thinks something bad about it saying something like (as if) one feels something good towards someone when one doesn't feel like this, one feels something bad towards this someone -fantasy, absurdity, obscurity:
saying about something "it is like this: ….", when people can know that it can't be like this saying about something "it is like this: ….", when everyone knows that it can't be like this, they can't not know it -imitative, performance-based manners of speaking:
saying something like someone else often says something like this saying something so that when people hear it, they can think: this is not this person's voice, it is someone else's voice -word play: puns, ambiguity, double entendre when people hear these words, they can think: I know what this someone wants to say with these words; at the same time, they can think: people can say something else with these words
